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Abstract
Recent neuroscientific evidence brings into question the conclusion that all aspects of
consciousness are gone in patients who have descended into a persistent vegetative state (PVS).
Here we summarize the evidence from human brain imaging as well as neurological damage in
animals and humans suggesting that some form of consciousness can survive brain damage that
commonly causes PVS. We also raise the issue that neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw
emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of those
feelings. Likewise, the basic brain mechanisms for thirst and hunger exist in brain regions typically
not damaged by PVS. If affective feelings can exist without cognitive awareness of those feelings,
then it is possible that the instinctual emotional actions and pain "reflexes" often exhibited by PVS
patients may indicate some level of mentality remaining in PVS patients. Indeed, it is possible such
raw affective feelings are intensified when PVS patients are removed from life-supports. They may
still experience a variety of primary-process affective states that could constitute forms of suffering.
If so, withdrawal of life-support may violate the principle of nonmaleficence and be tantamount to
inflicting inadvertent "cruel and unusual punishment" on patients whose potential distress, during
the process of dying, needs to be considered in ethical decision-making about how such individuals
should be treated, especially when their lives are ended by termination of life-supports. Medical
wisdom may dictate the use of more rapid pharmacological forms of euthanasia that minimize
distress than the de facto euthanasia of life-support termination that may lead to excruciating
feelings of pure thirst and other negative affective feelings in the absence of any reflective
awareness.
Introduction
In current medical practice, consciousness after brain
damage is typically graded into 5 major categories: coma,
persistent vegetative state (PVS), akinetic mutism, hyperk-
inetic mutism and delirium [1,2]. Coma and PVS are con-
sidered to constitute a brain state where the lights of
consciousness have dimmed completely, usually tempo-
rarily in coma and typically forever in PVS during which,
it is widely believed, only the control of bodily functions
and unconscious neural processes continue in the brain.
There are emerging reasons to re-consider such a conclu-
sion.
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Although modern neuroscience has by no means
embraced the study of consciousness, it has become a
major topic of discussion and empirical work in the larger
arena of mind sciences; however scientifically solid insights
and progress have been modest [3]. The topic largely
remains a focus of philosophical discussion and specula-
tion. At best there are suggestive findings, with nothing so
definitive as to have garnered general agreement on how
to measure consciousness, how many types there are, and
how it is constituted within the brain. It is still commonly
claimed that only humans are conscious, while most
other animals are only complex neurobiological
machines with no internal experiences. Indeed, some very
bright people claim that even if consciousness exists in
complex biophysical mechanisms like human brains, it
may be epiphenomenal, having no causal efficacy in the
control of behavior. Clearly, consciousness is a concept
that remains in flux. All of these issues impact neurologi-
cal practice that has to deal with impairments of con-
sciousness, and it is truly a nightmarish ethical dilemma
on how to treat people with seemingly totally impaired
consciousness, when the possibility exists that fragments
of consciousness remain.
We only highlight these issues to be clear, at the outset,
that there is little agreement about issues and concepts in
this area. Thus, to try to deal with a topic such as whether
any consciousness remains in people who have descended
into PVS cannot be definitively resolved by science right
now. Hence, any attempt to discuss ethical issues that sur-
round treatment of people in such states, will have to be
an exercise in possibilities, based on the weighing of sci-
entific evidence, where every finding has multiple inter-
pretations. However, a discussion of possibilities is
important for two reasons: 1) Society at large, and the
legal system, are not as concerned with discussions about
the existence and importance of consciousness in humans
as are some philosophers and scientists. They simply
accept the obvious conclusion, on prima facia evidence,
that consciousness is an incredibly important part of each
and every normal human life, and fall back on informed
medical opinion, rather than science, on where we stand
in this murky area of provisional knowledge. 2) Clearly an
ethical society would treat people differently if they have
any consciousness left than if they do not, which requires
periodic re-evaluation of scientific progress and evidence
in this arena. Thus, our discussion is premised on the
acceptance of these framing issues as reasonable starting
points for this inquiry into the ethical issues.
We will first present the most critical ethical issues as we
see them, especially when it comes to the matter of
whether to terminate medical life-support for these unfor-
tunate individuals, and if that decision is made, what kind
of guidelines should be considered in order to insure that
individuals, in their passage toward bodily death, shall
not be subjected to "cruel and unusual punishment"...
something that we legally provide for convicted criminals,
and surely would not deny unfortunate innocents.
We will highlight one major concern that should be fore-
most in peoples minds, but has received little attention in
several recent high profile cases, like that of Terry Schiavo.
The most important ethical issue as we see it, is whether
someone like Ms. Schiavo, who had no apparent aware-
ness of events around her, might still have had rudimen-
tary emotional and bodily feelings in her
uncomprehending mind. Eventually, at the behest of the
legal system, artificial alimentation was terminated, and
she was allowed to die from dehydration. The essential
question, as we see it, is whether there is any good reason
to believe that she may have experienced distressing, per-
haps excruciating, pure thirst, without cognitive reflec-
tions, before she died. On the basis of current
neuroscientific thinking, we believe an adequate case can
be made for such a possibility. All the basic mechanisms
of thirst exist in brain areas that typically remain undam-
aged in PVS. If there is reasonable scientific evidence to
consider such possibilities – namely that affective feelings
can exist within the brain without reflective awareness –
then it is possible that Ms. Schiavo and others treated like
her were subjected to "cruel and unusual suffering" by
both legal and medical systems during their "natural"
dying process.
We recognize that this is a very controversial perspective
to an issue not yet resolved, so we will pursue the argu-
ment first by providing a synopsis of what we scientifically
know about PVS. Following a description of the PVS con-
dition, we will highlight why existing neuroscience data
can presently support the possibility of a low level of con-
sciousness, what we would call affective consciousness [4]
still being operative in a brain that has succumbed to PVS.
To anticipate our main point, we will argue that in a prim-
itive unreflective state of affective consciousness, strictly in
the phenomenal rather than self-reflective realm, one can
feel pure pain, pure fear, pure anger, and other pure emo-
tional feelings that are free of cognitive awareness. There
are good reasons to believe such affective, raw experiential
states can exist in the lower regions of human and animal
brains when all higher substrates of mentality, especially
of the neocortex, the widely accepted seat for all higher
cognitive abilities including self-reflective experience and
thought, is eliminated.
Although various kinds of brain damage can lead to PVS,
it is generally agreed that if adult human beings were to
lose all of their neocortex, they would fall into a persistent
vegetative state. At the end of our description of PVS, we
will summarize evidence for the conclusion that whenPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:32 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/32
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such brain damage is inflicted on very young experimen-
tal animals, or when this type of damage occurs congeni-
tally in human children, by all available external
indicators, they are still capable of raw affective experi-
ences, even though they no longer have any apparent
thoughts or awareness of having such experiences. If our
interpretation of these kinds of severe neurological condi-
tions is correct, then both our medical and legal systems
need to re-evaluate and perhaps modify how PVS patients
deserve to be treated at the end of life.
A short description of the persistent vegetative state
In 1940 Ernst Kretschmer described a condition he named
"apallic syndrome" a state "without cortex". Twenty-three
years later, Arnaud and colleagues [5] coined the phrase
vie vegetative, to describe a subset of patients with severe
head injury. It was not until 1972 that Jennett and Plum
attempted to describe the clinical features of what is now
known as the vegetative state (VS). Consequently, the
same authors proposed the concept of a Persistent Vegeta-
tive State (PVS) to distinguish patients who remain in a
PVS from those who ascend through a vegetative state
from coma to consciousness. The year 1982 brought a fur-
ther distinction between "persistent" and "permanent"
vegetative state (pVS; [6]), based on the very low probabil-
ity of recovery from a PVS that lasts longer than 12
months. In 1991 a Multi-Society Task Force on PVS
(MSTF) was established with the goal to provide guide-
lines (clinically and ethically) for diagnosis and treatment
of this syndrome. The resulting two articles published in
The New England Journal of Medicine [7] are currently
considered the authoritative voice on this condition. PVS
as it is understood today is characterized by 7 diagnostic
criteria:
"1) No evidence of awareness of self or environment and
an inability to interact with others. 2) No evidence of sus-
tained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary behavioral
responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious stimuli.
3) No evidence of language comprehension or expression.
4) Intermittent wakefulness manifested by the presence of
sleep-wake cycles. 5) Sufficiently preserved hypothalamic
and brain-stem autonomic functions to permit survival
with medical and nursing care. 6) Bowel and bladder
incontinence, and 7) Variably preserved cranial-nerve
reflexes [...] and spinal reflexes." (Task-Force, page 1501)
A PVS can arise for a number of reasons, and the clinical
course of this state depends on the particular underlying
disorder. There are three main categories of neural injury
that can lead to a PVS:
1) Acute Traumatic and Nontraumatic Injuries: The most
common acute causes of a PVS are head trauma and
hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy. It is rather difficult to
outline a common clinical course for these cases but the
PVS is usually preceded by a coma with a certain number
of these patients (1–14%) their condition develops into a
PVS. To date it is not entirely clear which properties of a
coma predict a vegetative outcome; however the presence
of ventilatory dysfunction, decorticate posturing, and
extraneural trauma soon after the insult are potential indi-
cators. Other correlates include advanced age, pupillary
abnormalities, and a low motor response score. In non-
traumatic comas an impairment of eye opening, the pres-
ence of abnormal oculocephalic, abnormal motor
responses, and the inability to obey commands after two
weeks are all correlated with a vegetative outcome.
2) Degenerative and Metabolic Disorders: Various degen-
erative and metabolic nervous system disorders in adults
and children inevitably progress into an irreversible vege-
tative state.
3) Developmental malformations: The immaturity of the
developing brain at early ages presents a considerable
challenge for the diagnosis of a PVS in infants and chil-
dren. Most of the criteria used for diagnosis are not appli-
cable to patients less than 3 months old. In these patients
it is difficult to distinguish between voluntary and invol-
untary responses, or to detect sleep-wake cycles.
Neuropathology and the persistent vegetative state
Due to the various etiologies, it has proved difficult to
define PVS based simply on a shared neuropathology. Yet,
over the years, certain communalities have emerged that
are consistent with the idea that PVS, more or less, repre-
sents a state of functional decortication. One of the first
attempts to assess the underlying neural basis of the per-
sistent vegetative state was made by Kinney and Samuels
[8]. In their review they proposed three characteristic pat-
terns of brain damage associated with a vegetative state.
These patterns involved damage to the cerebral cortex,
widespread damage to the white matter of both hemi-
spheres, and damage to the thalamus.
The Task-Force on PVS [7] identified two main sources of
Brain damage in PVS patients:
1) Diffuse laminar cortical necrosis, which is typically a
result of global hypoxia and ischemia. Extensive multifo-
cal cortical necrosis that almost invariably involves the
hippocampus and may be accompanied by damage to
hypothalamus, and areas of the brain stem.
2.) Diffuse axonal injury (DAI) is due to a shearing injury
as a result of acute trauma. The resulting axonal damage
isolates the cortex from other parts of the brain. Occasion-
ally DAI is also accompanied by small lesions in the brain-
stem.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:32 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/32
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When Kampfl and colleagues [9] conducted a magnetic-
resonance imaging (MRI) study on 80 patients in a vege-
tative state they found damage in the corpus callosum, the
main connection between brain hemispheres, in 98% of
the patients, and also detected injuries to the white matter
of the frontal and temporal lobes. Lesions in both corpus
callosum and the dorsolateral brainstem were described
as the most frequent combination in this subset of PVS
patients.
More recent post mortem studies on the anatomical basis
of PVS [10] detected DAI in 70–80% of the studied brains.
Other common features included abnormalities in the
thalamus in near 80% and ischemic damage in close to
40% of the patients.
Giacino & Whyte [11], identified two patterns of brain
damage in a VS. The most common pattern is Diffuse
Axonal Injury (DAI) associated with moderate to severe
ischemic damage that usually involves the thalamus.
More recently, Graham and colleagues [12] described
neurodegenerative changes in the thalamus and hippoc-
ampus associated with this pattern. A second less com-
mon pattern leading to a vegetative state is characterized
by focal brain stem lesions, not accounted for by DAI.
In essence all of these findings support the conclusion
that neural damage either to large cortical regions
(hypoxia/ischemia), or to brain areas connecting cortex
and brain stem (thalamus), as well as damage to the con-
nections between cortical areas (corpus callosum, tha-
lamo-cortical loops, DAI) can lead to a PVS. Therefore the
old notion of an "apallic state," reflecting a functional dis-
connect of cortex and brain stem can still be maintained.
It should also be emphasized that severe damage of the
brainstem seldom occurs in PVS patients [7] and that
brainstem damage alone, even if initially provoking
coma, rarely results in a vegetative state [13].
Neuroimaging of PVS
In current clinical practice, the diagnosis of a persistent
vegetative state does not fully utilize neuroimaging tech-
niques, but relies heavily upon bedside clinical evalua-
tion. The use of electroencephalogram (EEG) and
functional neuroimaging techniques cannot fully replace
the current techniques used to diagnose patients with con-
sciousness disorders; however they can potentially aid
practitioners in identifying the specific traits of the
patients' injury and in forming a better rehabilitation
strategy. In the following we provide a brief overview of
the properties of PVS when examined with electrophysio-
logical and brain imaging techniques with some emphasis
on the question if such measures could provide some evi-
dence for the presence or absence of phenomenal experi-
ence, perhaps even some awareness, in a state that, by
definition, excludes the possibility of conscious experi-
ence.
Electrophysiological measures of brain activity
The EEG is a measure of cortical activity that is widely used
to study arousal states, most prominently sleep wake
cycles, epileptic seizures, or the actions of drugs on the
brain. In clinical practice it is also used to determine brain
death (i.e. an absence of cortical brain activity signified by
an isoelectric EEG), and therefore has ramifications for
the legal definition of death.
The EEG of healthy subjects can be interpreted as a relia-
ble indicator of attention and arousal states. For instance,
in healthy subjects, a mixed frequency low amplitude
(desynchronized) EEG accompanies alert wakefulness
while a synchronized alpha rhythm (8–13 Hz) that is sup-
pressed by light (vision-induced alpha blocking) is char-
acteristic for a state of relaxed wakefulness. Rapid eye
movement (REM) sleep is characterized by an EEG similar
to alert wakefulness, while synchronized high amplitude
theta (4–8 Hz) and delta (1–4 Hz) waves are found during
the various stages of non-REM sleep. Also, sustained
higher frequency rhythms (beta and gamma) in the corti-
cal EEG have received considerable attention as potential
correlates of consciousness (e.g. [14]).
When considering the cortical EEG of PVS patients we
have to keep in mind that:
1) PVS is a state, not a disease. It is the endpoint to many
pathologies. Consequently, and not surprisingly, the EEG
of PVS can vary considerably among patients.
2) PVS is entered through a coma. Electrophysiologically
PVS and coma represent a continuum.
3) PVS is a long term but variable brain state and, over
time, the properties of the EEG may change [7]. During a
slow recovery from traumatic injury some properties of a
healthy EEG may return over time while the patient,
nonetheless, remains in a VS.
Many PVS patients show an EEG of "diffuse generalized
polymorphic delta or theta activity" [7]; generally, a slow-
ing of EEG background activity is associated with altera-
tions of consciousness, stupor and coma [15]. Some
patients display an almost isoelectric EEG while the brain
activity of other patients is characterized by a continuous
non-responsive alpha rhythm. In a few patients the EEG is
reported to be near normal, with the exception of vision-
induced alpha blocking [7,16]. Also, EEG patterns do not
change in response to stimulation with the interesting
occasional exception of noxious stimulation [7]. Such
EEG properties are shared by many comatose and evenPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:32 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/32
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minimally conscious state (MCS) patients. Gamma activ-
ity has been found to be present in all tested PVS patients
[17], however, an increase of gamma power together with
conjugate eye movements, a sign of voluntary movement
in healthy subjects, was only seen in "less severe" cases
[17]. To our knowledge, only one EEG study (quantitative
electric tomography, QEEGt) detected specific activity
changes in the EEG spectrum of an 8 year old PVS patient
in response to his mothers voice [18]. However single case
studies, especially in a state with such an obvious poten-
tial for misdiagnosis have to be interpreted with caution
(also see below).
Considering the history of the EEG, its wide use in sleep
research, and the very definition of human sleep as a com-
bination of electrophysiological and behavioral parame-
ters one would be inclined to believe that the clinical
definition of "sleep-wake cycle" in PVS should rely on
EEG measures; however, this is not the case. The defini-
tion of sleep in PVS is entirely behavioral. The patient will
show periods of behavioral inactivity with closed eyes that
are followed by periods of (non purposeful) behavioral
activity with open eyes. An EEG study on sleep in PVS
patients revealed that the EEG during this behavioral
sleep-wake cycle can be quite variable [19]. In one patient
no cortial surface EEG changes between "sleep" and
"wakefulness" were observed, in some an EEG of low
amplitude delta and theta waves were observed during
behavioral sleep. In two of these patients the slow wave
activity increased over time. None of the patients showed
consistent sleep staging, and EEG indicators of REM sleep
were entirely absent. In contrast other studies were able to
identify behavioral indicators of REM sleep (myoclonus
and rapid eye movements) in PVS patients [20]. One
could therefore interpret these findings in a way that the
midbrain/pontine and hypothalamic sleep/wake genera-
tors are functional and active. However, because in most
cases of PVS the connectivity between lower brain areas
and cortex is diminished, cortical EEG activity does not
show the full range of changes associated with normal
sleep.
Event related potentials (ERPs), a derivate of the EEG,
have shown some promise in investigating cognitive
processing and possibly conscious awareness in PVS
patients. ERPs are small positive and negative deflections
of the EEG that occur time-locked to specific (commonly
auditory) signals. ERPs are characterized by positive (P)
and negative (N) deflections of early, middle and late
components which are believed to contain information
about signal processing. Late components are typically
associated with higher level cortical processing and corre-
late in some cases with the presence or absence of con-
scious experience. This makes them a potential tool in the
assessment of awareness.
ERP studies have provided some evidence of higher order
cortical processing in PVS patients. The N1–P2 complex,
an indicator of low level cortical processing has been
detected in most PVS patients [16]. Mismatch negativity
(MMN) and P3, ERP components accompanying higher
order processing have also been detected in a number of
patients [21]; however, none of these components are
clear indicators of conscious awareness. Nevertheless, the
MMN an evoked response to stimulus deviation seems to
be of particular value in predicting the outcome of PVS
[16,22]. Its presence during the acute phase of coma
allows for exclusion of PVS as a possible endpoint [22],
and its occurrence in PVS patients predicts recovery from
their current state [22-24]. The late ERP component "pain-
related P-250" has been found to be greatly depressed [25]
in vegetative states, therefore PVS patients may not be
aware of pain. Interestingly, Katayama and colleagues [25]
also demonstrated that deep brain stimulation can restore
the P-250 in some PVS patients.
Functional neuroimaging
With the development of functional neuroimaging tech-
niques such as positron emission tomography (PET) scans
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), new
insights into the nature of the persistent vegetative state
have been gained.
PET scans of patients in a vegetative state consistently
show a reduction in cerebral metabolism with lower met-
abolic activity associated with the duration of a vegetative
state [26]. Laureys et al. [27] showed major impairment of
the prefrontal, premotor and parietotemporal association
areas, as well as in the posterior cingulate cortex/pre-
cuneus in their study of the vegetative state using PET
scans. This correlates the vegetative state with a cortical
disconnect between association cortices, rather than struc-
tural cortical damage [26,27]. Moreover, other studies
have shown that in addition to altered cortical connectiv-
ity, the corticothalamic system may also be deficient [28].
Functional neuroimaging of sensory processes
Studies have used functional neuroimaging to look for the
subsistence of sensory and perceptual systems in people
with consciousness disorders with the intent to elucidate
if the patients retain some form of awareness. Visual fixa-
tion and tracking is a property seen in a minimally con-
scious state; however the extent of the patient's awareness
of stimuli is unknown because the patient is unable to
articulate a response. It is possible that these visual actions
may represent involuntary responses devoid of cognitive
properties ([26], see also EEG above). Studies using PET
scans to observe patients' response to flashes of light
showed consistent activation of primary visual cortex;
however a further activation of higher-order association
areas was not detected [26].Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:32 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/32
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Similar to studies of visual stimulation, simple auditory
stimuli resulted in an activation of primary sensory cortex,
but failed to reach higher order processing areas of the
posterior parietal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and
hippocampus [26]. Further evidence for the lack of
higher-order processing of sensory stimuli in a vegetative
state can be seen in a study investigating brain activation
in response to noxious somatosensory stimuli. The
responses of patients in a vegetative state in response to
high-intensity median nerve stimulation at levels previ-
ously shown to be painful in control subjects were
recorded using PET scans. This study showed activation of
primary somatosensory cortex as well as midbrain and
thalamus activity in all patients, yet with a lack of associ-
ative cortical activation, similar to the results of other sen-
sory studies in PVS patients [29].
In summary, functional neuroimaging studies of sensory
processing in patients suffering from disorders of con-
sciousness strengthen the theory of a cortical disconnect
in patients in a vegetative state. Studies investigating vis-
ual, auditory, and somatosensory processing all showed
that PVS patients retained some activation of primary sen-
sory cortex areas without further processing in nearby
association areas [26]. In short, sensory signals in these
patients reach the cortex, but the extent to which these sig-
nals are experienced a primary-process perception
remains unclear.
Learning in a persistent vegetatives state
The evidence of cortical learning in a vegetative state is
limited. Indeed, few controlled studies on this subject
have been performed. Koutchoubey and colleagues [30]
report habituation of the blink reflex in some PVS
patients, and also demonstrated that the cortical ERP
component N1 shows habituation over time, indicating
some continuation of both subcortical and cortical learn-
ing process. Accordingly, additional conditioning studies
should be conducted with emotionally provocative stim-
uli to determine how much plasticity, especially of emo-
tional capacities, persist in PVS.
Possible conscious awareness in PVS
A recent fMRI study of a clinically diagnosed PVS patient
showed specific brain activation with the administration
of two different spoken instructions. In one instance the
patient was asked to imagine playing tennis, while in the
other the patient was instructed to imagine visiting all the
rooms of their house. Brain activity changes were congru-
ent with those observed in controls under both conditions
[31].
While it is possible to entertain the idea that this study
shows strong evidence for conscious awareness in the
patient, the brain activation may have been an automatic
response to the presented narrative [32]. Although the
study does not indicate any conscious "decision to coop-
erate" in the subject, it does highlight potential shortcom-
ings of common clinical diagnosis. According to the
authors, the patient examined met all clinical require-
ments of PVS. However, the observed brain activation in
response to the instructions suggests either a misdiagnosis
or some higher information processing capabilities in a
PVS state. A misdiagnosis seems more likely, considering
that a single patient was examined. The fMRI data may
indicate that this patient may have progressed into a min-
imally conscious state distinguished by the ability to fol-
low commands while still lacking the capacity to
communicate [33].
Imaging techniques and consciousness
Can the techniques of modern neuroscience provide us
with a definitive answer as to whether patients in vegetative
states retain some remnants of phenomenal experience or
not? The simple answer is no, not presently. However,
only a few years ago it was equivalent to heresy to men-
tion consciousness and neuroscience within the same
breath, let alone to attempt scientific research on the sub-
ject. The study of awareness and the neural correlates of
consciousness are new branches of experimental neuro-
science and although some promising findings encourage
future research into remnants of phenomenal experience
in PVS, the present state of knowledge allows for hypoth-
eses at best, not for any differential clinical diagnosis. Also
we do not want to imply that the current predominantly
behavioral methods of diagnosing disorders of conscious-
ness are fully acceptable. In both cases the diagnosis relies
on correlates-behavioral or neural correlates. Such corre-
lates may be sufficient to avoid a misdiagnosis in the strict
sense, to distinguish e.g. between a locked in syndrome
and a PVS. The root of the problem, however, is the ques-
tion whether a properly diagnosed PVS patient may have
some remnants of phenomenal sensory or affective expe-
riences. These problems cannot be addressed by behavio-
ral measures, while imaging techniques, at present, are
not fully developed to address such questions. This leaves
us with some enormous ethical dilemmas.
Historically, it has been often assumed that conscious
experience is solely a property of the neocortex. In our
estimation, there is little empirical support for such an
extreme corticocentric view of consciousness. There really
is no well-conceived reason as to why subcortical brain
structures should not be able to generate unreflective
affective states and basic experiences of homeostatic
drives such as thirst or hunger, and abundant research in
animal models that has worked out some of the details of
such brain processes (see below) strengthens this assump-
tion [34-36]. The fact that in PVS patients damage to cor-
tex and thalamus is more pronounced than damage toPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:32 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/32
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lower brain areas strongly suggests that such raw affective
states could still be experienced by patients in a vegetative
state.
Affective vs. Cognitive Consciousness
When it comes to understanding consciousness, defini-
tional problems and disagreements can abort clear com-
munication. Although there is a very rich conceptual
literature on these topics which cannot be covered here
[3], and various distinct types of consciousness have been
proposed, the present discussion will rely on the distinc-
tion between affective and cognitive consciousness that
has been developed by the senior author [4,34,35,37].
A functional evolutionary view of phenomenal conscious-
ness, namely the here and now experience provided by
outward sensory portals as well as the intrinsic functions
of the brain mind, suggests there are ancient, affective
forms of consciousness that emerged long before organ-
isms developed any sophisticated cognitive abilities such
as the capacity to reflect on ones experiences, and to know
one was conscious. Current knowledge of the brain
strongly supports the idea that primary-process affective
experiences emerged in brain evolution earlier than those
high cognitive processes that allow us to think and talk
about our internal experiences (i.e., secondary and tertiary
forms of consciousness). In all mammals, the neural sys-
tems that are essential for emotionality are concentrated
in more medial and ventral brain regions than most cog-
nitive processes. These ancient systems seem to be the epi-
centers for emotional and other basic affective experiences
such as the pleasure of taste and the distress of homeo-
static imbalances from air-hunger to thirst [36].
Although no one has decoded how affective experience is
constructed from neural activities, it is clear that there is a
complex instinctual-emotional brain situated in deep sub-
cortical regions. This is simply demonstrated by the ability
to provoke a variety of coherent emotional behaviors
using localized electrical stimulation of the brain (ESB)
applied to those circuits [34,35,37]. One can also ask ani-
mals whether they like, dislike or feel neutral about such
stimulation. They are rarely uncertain; they turn on ESB
that seems to evoke positive external appearances, such as
foraging, sexuality, and predatory behaviors, and they
turn off ESB that evokes emotions that most would con-
sider aversive, such as fear and anger. A remarkable aspect
of these studies is that the affective intensity increases as
one stimulates ever lower reaches of these systems, as in
the periaqueductal gray, where emotional responses and
feelings (in both humans and animals) are provoked by
the lowest levels of ESB [37].
Since the "center of gravity" for emotional feelings resides
in more ancient parts of the brain than most cognitive
functions, we can surmise that those brain regions have a
primitive affective-experiential mind of their own. How
can this be evaluated? The clearest evidence comes from
radical decortication when animals are very young. Abun-
dant work has been done with such preparations, espe-
cially in laboratory rats, and the general principle is that
these animals look very normal, exhibiting all of their
instinctual emotional tendencies, including playfulness
[38]. Indeed, they show improved behavior in certain dif-
ficult learning tasks such as two-way avoidance (shuttling
between two successively dangerous areas of a test box),
where normal animals get befuddled and apparently so
intimidated that their immobility prevents efficient
behavior. Decorticate animals, being generally disinhib-
ited, shuttle readily, probably with no awareness of the
benefits their tendencies for over-activity are producing
for them (Panksepp, unpublished personal observation).
These animals are also not as perceptually impaired as one
might expect from studies of animals decorticated at an
older age when cortical functions have matured [39].
If animals can function so effectively without their corti-
ces, how about humans? Obviously, just as in other ani-
mals, decortication after maturity dramatically
deteriorates cognitive ability, to the point where such
humans would typically descend into PVS. However, this
is not the case with infants that are born without their
higher brain apparatus, especially if they have been reared
in a loving environment with abundant, emotionally sup-
portive experiences [40]. Such children seem to experi-
ence the world affectively and perceptually, but they have
no way to tell anyone about their experiences. That must
be inferred from behavior. This is a dilemma, for one can
have no certainty of the level of their experiential capaci-
ties, but when the external manifestations are intact, and
when the relevant brain science, supports a dual-aspect
monism view of how emotional feelings emerge from
neural circuits [35,41], then the weight of evidence sup-
ports that such creatures do have a level of mentality that
deserves our attention and respect. Dual aspect monism
in affective neuroscience reflects the viewpoint that pri-
mary-process psychological processes, such as affect, arise
from brain dynamics that are a real part of nature and that
such evaluative feelings are isomorphic with certain types
of large scale neural network dynamics that are strongly
linked to inherited brain-mind potentials. Various
instinctual feelings seem to arise from genetically pro-
vided circuits within ancient regions of the mammalian
brain.
The common failure not to distinguish among the evolu-
tionary layers of consciousness can lead to many concep-
tual conundrums and communicative confusions. For
instance, some emotion researchers view emotional expe-
rience as reflecting the highest neocortical reaches of thePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:32 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/32
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human brain [42,43], while our reading of the evidence is
that raw affective experience is almost completely a sub-
neocortical experience [37,41]. Obviously, such investiga-
tors are talking about different evolutionary levels of con-
sciousness, and most seem to put more stock on the
cognitive awareness aspects than the more primitive affec-
tive state functions that may not be intrinsically accompa-
nied by self awareness.
Thus, the present analysis is based on the primal assump-
tion that the raw phenomenal experience of organisms
living in highly variable environments reflects the most
important survival-mediating, value-generating structures
of the brain.
In our estimation, affective consciousness, perhaps the
most ancient variant (think of pure pain), arises from the
capacity of our brain to experience the biological values of
the body – organismic conditions that can uncondition-
ally enhance or detract from survival. Cognitive con-
sciousness – the ability to discriminate multifarious
differences in the world – seems not to be foundational in
the capacity of the brain to have raw affective experiences.
Do PVS patients still have remnants of affective conscious-
ness? We cannot be certain, but we can be sure they still
exhibit a variety of instinctual behaviors, such as apparent
anger attacks, that may not simply be "sham rage" accom-
panied by no internal feelings states. If raw emotional
feelings are created by such brain activities, we should find
no comfort in the fact that we have simply defined away
the potential existence of raw affective experiences within
the mental remnants of such PVS patients.
Raw Affective Experience in PVS and Emerging Ethical 
Issues
The PVS state and how various social groups in our culture
respond to such helpless patients are pregnant with ethi-
cal ambiguities, especially so once the withdrawal of life-
support is considered. Although, all we can do is consider
possibilities, with no definitive prescription, we take as
our categorical imperative that all quarters of society,
whether governmental, medical, religious, or every-day
people, should minimize the likelihood of suffering dur-
ing the end of life, whether it be "natural" or induced.
We acknowledge that there can be considerable debate
about whether suffering can exist without reflective aware-
ness. We believe it can, especially when one recognizes
that the aversive component of suffering arises largely
from an intensely negative affective state, and that under
normal circumstances, cognitive activity, if anything,
tends to reduce the intensity of experienced affect [44].
Thus, the sustained persistence of excruciating negative
affect, in the absence of reflective awareness, may be a ter-
rible experience.
At the point where termination of life support is consid-
ered, once any reasonable medical expectation of func-
tional recovery has dimmed, there is a shift in the
equation from the possibility of inflicting "suffering," in
the hope of obtaining recovery, to inflicting "cruel and
unusual suffering/punishment" (as imposed "suffering,"
when hope of recovery has been relinquished, may
become isomorphic with "punishment"). In the absence
of definitive knowledge about the affective suffering of
PVS patients, something that is not empirically achievable
at present, "intent to cause suffering" (i.e. punishment)
only becomes part of the overall equation, depending on
whether one believes that there is currently enough
"weight of evidence" to be concerned about the potential
for primary-process negative affective states in PVS
patients. We believe such evidence now exists (previous
section). Even though the 1994 Task-Force report on PVS
[7] did raise the topic of "pain and suffering," without
considering other highly aversive states such a thirst, sus-
tained cramps and many other bodily discomforts, they
concluded that since these patients were "unconscious by
definition" that "precludes these experiences."
We believe new knowledge and evolutionary perspectives
do not preclude raw, unreflective affective experiences in
the mental residue of PVS patients. Indeed, the PVS Task-
Force [7], recognized that in PVS patients "subcortical
nociceptive responses produce patterned behaviors, such
as grimace-like or crying-like behavior similar to that
accompanying conscious emotional responses." How-
ever, they concluded that since "conscious awareness of
pain or the experience of suffering occurs at a cortical
level" the instinctual behavioral indices of pain do not
actually reflect the experience of any pain. Regrettably, the
Task-Force did not attempt to make any distinction
between the ability of an individual to be aware of one's
pain, and the ability to experience a purely unreflective
form of pain. PVS patients also show seemingly painful
cramps, "sham" rage attacks, and other instinctual indices
of emotional states. As summarized in the previous sec-
tion, the neuroscientific evidence now strongly suggests
that raw emotional experiences arise, in part, from those
same brain systems that mediate emotional-instinctual
responses [34,35,41]. There is currently no compelling
evidence that raw emotional feelings emerge through some
kind of a "read-out" processes whereby higher neocortical
processes that mediate awareness of the world reinterpret
lower instinctual brain functions.
The medical system has traditionally chosen to make the
concept of cognitive "awareness" an essential, if not the
sole, conceptual criterion of consciousness. By doing so,Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:32 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/32
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they have, simply by conceptual definition, eliminated
affective experience from the potential residual mentality
of PVS patients. By siding with the assumption that all aver-
sive experiences require cortical participation, they have
generated a practical consensus policy on how to concep-
tualize PVS. However, the concept of a primitive affective
phenomenal consciousness provides an alternative per-
spective that now mandates a reconsideration of what is
and what is not supported by existing evidence. To the
extent that ambiguities remain, policy should dictate that
patients are insured absence of any primary-process agony
as much as possible.
If we consider the accruing evidence and theory about the
basic nature of affect, and use it as a guideline for our
thinking, we would be wise to accept the realistic possibility
(although perhaps not the high probability, as we do) that
PVS patients can still experience some remnants of affec-
tive experience even though their cognitive abilities are
gone. If we do, there are some clear ethical consequences
that need to be considered by all quarters of society,
regardless of ones cultural, political or religious disposi-
tions.
The moment we acknowledge the possibility that an indi-
vidual in a vegetative state may experience raw affective
experiences, the mere discontinuation of life support in
the form of food or drink cannot be a viable strategy, if the
goal remains to "do no harm." We are now confronted
with the possibility that the patient, on her/his passage to
death, is experiencing excruciating feelings of hunger,
thirst or pain sometimes for many days. An inability to
outwardly communicate this suffering may be emotion-
ally comforting to family members and medical person-
nel, but this only underscores once more how much our
everyday definition of wellbeing depends on coordinated
behavioral output, a route that is cut off for patients in a
vegetative state. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned
that similar issues are being debated in the criminal justice
system, where the use of muscular paralytics during lethal
injections, denies the condemned the possibility of com-
municating their suffering, no matter how short that may
be (as we write this, the United States' Supreme Court has
agreed to reconsider this issue).
Consequently, to ensure that patients will not be exposed
to feelings of discomfort (or to limit feelings of discomfort
to as short a period as humanly possible) it becomes nec-
essary to either supplement the discontinuation of life-
support with pharmacological means that are most likely
to alleviate any distress, as might be achieved with mixed
opiate agonists/antagonists such as buprenorphine, or to
provide a form of active euthanasia (e.g. a full opioid
overdose to make the passage to death as rapid and bear-
able as possible). We realize and respect that today, for
many members of society and for a variety of reasons,
such an act is entirely unacceptable. In the end, we believe
that such decisions should always be left to the patient (if
possible) or the patients family (supported by profession-
als). Indeed, if constrained only by logic, active euthana-
sia seems a viable strategy considering that, if our
hypothesis is wrong and PVS patients lack conscious expe-
rience no additional harm is done by e.g. an overdose of
drugs that can promote and sustain positive affect. On the
contrary, if we were only right in a single case the individ-
ual would benefit enormously. However, it is not the pur-
pose of this article to make a strong case for
discontinuation of life support, merely to bring to atten-
tion what needs to be considered if it is entertained as an
option.
It seems plausible that the possibility of raw affective
experience in a PVS state may sway some individuals or
institutions to take an even firmer stance against all forms
of discontinuation of life support, whether passive or
active euthanasia. Despite this dilemma, we do need to
recognize the potential of these patients to experience
something. There is probably general agreement that we
should aim to make these experiences as positive as possi-
ble. Of course, indefinite continuation of life support
would lead into immense financial burdens on individu-
als, certain institutions and society as a whole. But we
believe costs should not figure as a priority in an ethical
discussion, and we do not believe that indefinite continu-
ation of life-support is the only ethical option. At times
like this, quality of life issues loom large.
In any event, to fully evaluate the possibility that PVS
patients may have residues of affective consciousness in
their uncomprehending minds, we would urge the medi-
cal community to support additional research on this
topic. A variety of novel behavioral tasks, such as the clas-
sical conditioning of emotional responses, in conjunction
with the new brain imaging technologies, deserve to be
implemented more vigorously. The work of neurologists
and their ethical responsibilities are complete when they
have done everything currently possible to restore higher
forms of consciousness in such individuals using accepted
medical approaches, which in the future are likely to
include new neuropharmacological modalities, and per-
haps localized stimulation of subcortical networks that
have some potential to restore higher levels of mentation.
When doctors' skills and options have been exhausted,
their only remaining dictum is "do no harm." The mere
disconnection of life support does not ensure that.
Although ethics/morality is impossible to prescribe, we
would suggest that our knowledge of how brain functions
generate raw emotional feelings, has reached a point
where the existence of strong feelings in brains, withoutPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:32 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/32
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any remaining cognitive reflective capacity, is substan-
tively supported by our current understanding of how
brains operate. If so, such possibilities should figure heav-
ily in our ethical discussions of how to handle PVS indi-
viduals when termination of life-support is considered.
We recognize that our arguments are premised on the cur-
rent weight of evidence from functional neuroscience
rather than definitive facts. However, if raw feelings can
remain in the residual brain functions of PVS patients,
especially aversive affective ones, and if we do not recog-
nize those possibilities, we are in a position to make enor-
mous ethical blunders. Assuming all ethics ultimately are
based on the intrinsic values that give us various feelings
of goodness and badness, as some philosophers like David
Hume have postulated, we must consider the various pos-
sibilities that a raw affective consciousness perspective
offers for our ethical considerations [34,45].
The issue of what we, as a society, should do with some-
one who has a corner of consciousness left, even if we can-
not detect it in their outward communications, is of
momentous importance for any coherent vision of medi-
cal, governmental and religious ethics. We believe that in
such existential circumstances, individual rights should
prevail over all others. In a kind and just society, the
notion of permitting any "cruel and unusual suffering" is
so offensive that to impose "natural death" by simply
withdrawing life-supports, namely a form of slow de facto
euthanasia, with all the potential agonies of sustained
thirst, hunger and various emotional and bodily pains,
over a kind and rapid euthanasia, seems unreasonable. If
affective consciousness can exist without cognitive capac-
ities, removing life supports without providing graceful
alternatives opens up the possibility of inflicting too
many innocent people with a series of terrible feelings
that they are in no position to alleviate. If this actually
does happen in those unfortunates where courts have
accepted the mere termination of life-support, even
against family wishes, we may be condoning social prac-
tices that may be inflicting cruel and unusual punish-
ment/suffering on some of the most helpless members of
society. No human should be subjected to that. We do
need a new round of discussions on what it truly means to
be unconscious not just from an "awareness" point of
view, but also from a raw "phenomenal experience" per-
spective.
In sum, although PVS raises a host of difficult medical,
social, scientific and ethical issues, they can no longer be
adequately addressed without a frank confrontation with
the issue of how raw affective experience is created in the
brain. How we ethically treat patients who have suc-
cumbed to PVS, especially when termination of life-sup-
port is considered, will eventually need to be critically
informed by our emerging knowledge of what it means to
have highly aversive affective experiences that may exist
without reflective awareness. The mere termination of
"life support" may lead to needless suffering, and that
should be avoided.
NOTE
As pointed out by one of the reviewers (Joseph Verheijde)
an increasing shortage of organ transplants has resulted in
attempts to utilize PVS patients as potential organ donors.
Albeit inherently problematic [46,47], at present, the dead
donor rule (DDR) and the increasingly practiced dona-
tion after cardiac death (DCD), protect patients in a PVS
from organ procurement. In other words, PVS patients do
not meet the criteria for brain death (intact brain stem)
and therefore are typically able to autonomously main-
tain cardiac activity. Proposed changes to the definition of
death or a departure from the DDR [47,48] could however
change this situation. A plausible scenario would then
include PVS patients into a category described as "higher-
brain death" [48] which could likely result in organ pro-
curement under brain dead protocols, i.e. without anesthe-
sia  (Verheijde, personal communication). The idea of
redefining brain death as brain failure was discussed at the
President's Council on Bioethics on September 6, 2007
[49]. The Council discussed classifying individuals who
are unable to interact with the environment as having
brain failure and therefore such persons are to be consid-
ered dead. The rethinking of brain death criteria is moti-
vated by the need to increase opportunities for organ
procurement, but the issue of pure affective experience
must loom large as society considers pursuing that course
of action.
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